joseph ledoux psychology

And it’s not. 5. Valence directed behavior His exacts views on this are a bit fuzzy as he seems prepared to concede a raw background awareness but not a self. The pattern recognition process drives the unconscious development of action plans from the remembered “outcome” of the matched Story or Stories. They may not have our complex social emotions but I’m skeptical of the idea that they don’t have feeling states at all. Thanks Stephen. His numbers were between 50k and 200k years. Joseph LeDoux has provided a remarkable, personalized synthesis of zoology, neuroscience, psychology and philosophy: His main theme is the emergence of consciousness through the evolution of nervous systems and the behaviors they control: Not the tree of life, but the tree of consciousness, and where it may lead us. The cortical Story Engine operates unconsciously and constitutes 98% or greater of all cognitive operations. So, let’s call it Concessions 3, Conundrums 3 and Cortical Consciousness 0 … 😉. Joseph LeDoux has been working on the link between emotion, memory, and the brain since the 1990s. Possibly.”, Thanks for reading and reporting on LeDoux’s book Mike. After nearly four years, I’m still focused on the topic of Consciousness in the Block Universe, the research from which is obviously concentrated in those two areas and the creative part of which lies in trying to understand the meaning of the synthesis of the two. My fishing buddy and I have talked about fish a lot. The second form of “appearance” that I’m thinking about is the phenomenological, the feeling, the qualia. I’ve duly noted that final sentence: “However, as previously suggested, electrical stimulation may be exciting both inhibitory and excitatory connections in unnatural combinations, driving slower behavioral responses.”. Overall, consciousness is “the feeling of what happens.” As Mike pointed out, the input-mechanism-output definition includes plant tropisms (phototropism, geotropism, chemotropism, etc.) “you’ve not provided the details of those behaviors in the past and the statement directly contradicts Merker,”, For details on decerebration, there’s a section in the Recognition and Alleviation of Pain in Laboratory Animals report which describes it, and cites papers that go into more detail. In realtà, suggerisce Ledoux, il termine “paura” va riservato soltanto alla esperienza conscia della paura, mentre il termine “paura” non andrebbe proprio utilizzato quando si parla del circuito sottocorticale Please try again or consider that the cortical hypothesis is insupportable and your opinion stands in opposition to both the facts and the evidence. I just want to clarify your usage of the “thing-in-itself”. Intelligence. Now we don’t have to read it … 😉. That’s not a good example of Intelligence. A knee-jerk reflex is a prediction. That mankind claims an Intellect so much removed from Instinct, begs whether mankind thought it had comparisons of equally, or better, evolutionary strategies (NOT, says we), given the State of the World, the Earth and our collective Future today, rapidly multiplying Extinction on every corner of Life, mostly or most efficiently by mankind’s own obsessive rationality of ‘intellect’, or justifications of ‘affect’ made scientific and necessary by the same. I would have thought that Intellect better fitted the definition of your first sentence here, in more Higher Order respects, which would separate it from sheer Instinct and autonomic brain functions 500 million years realized. It’s Unicode U+21D2 in the Arrows block and I’ll place some between square brackets. Kant’s statement does apply to all of the physical world. “On requiring environmental influence, it might be that the ability to combine images was originally a malfunction, cross stream corruption of some sort, that just happened to lead to beneficial results, so it got selected for and fine tuned, but its development was always rooted in working with existing memories, which require an experiential history. And, again, the only “pre-mammalian capability” required for consciousness is simple sentience—to feel a single physical feeling is to be conscious of that feeling. That’s why it’s a well-known named conundrum. To recap: I quoted from Merker the obviously conscious behaviors of decorticated mammals and, in response, you stated that decerebrated mammals only demonstrated reflexive behaviors. Intellect requires sentience. Joseph LeDoux is the Henry and Lucy Moses Professor of Science at NYU in the Center for Neural Science. But we should be clear what’s missing. Semantic Scholar profile for Joseph E LeDoux, with 4067 highly influential citations and 559 scientific research papers. He directs the Emotional Brain Institute at New York University and… More about Joseph LeDoux Libri in inglese di joseph-ledoux: tutti i titoli e le novità in vendita online a prezzi scontati su IBS. Regarding PFS, I had read little or nothing about it until I saw the Vyshedskiy’s paper but apparently the concept dates from the 19th century. From that understanding, BRASH continues to explain that, as I wrote above: “As regards consciousness as a feeling, although most people conceive of feelings as being physical (body associated) feelings such as pain, touch, temperature (cold/hot) and the like, all of the contents of consciousness are feelings, including sight, hearing and, indeed, thought itself.”, I think it’s obvious then that emotions are feelings as well—the valenced affect consciousness you’ve mentioned. So, no intellect, no sentience. He directs the Emotional Brain Institute at New York University and at the Nathan Kline Institute, and is the author of Synaptic Self and The Emotional Brain. Enter your email address to follow this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email. In 1996 Joseph LeDoux's The Emotional Brain presented a revelatory examination of the biological bases of our emotions and memories. Verified by Psychology Today. Can we rule out that the midbrain doesn’t contribute to consciousness? In this Perspective, Joe LeDoux suggests research on emotion should be shifted away from assessing human-type emotion in other animals and towards questions about the extent to which circuits and functions related to survival in other animals are also Newborns don’t possess a store of long term memory. That “displaying” is the production of a feeling, which I theorize is a Neural Tissue Configuration, or NCT. Remarkable but apparently true! Animal studies have established that decerebrated animals only have reflexive behavior. Ramachandran defends the now unfashionable view that animals including great apes are not conscious. I’ve noticed that you’ve avoided making any suggestions about how the cortical consciousness theories resolve the several unanswered challenges I’ve presented since you haven’t proposed a single explanation for any of them. This has led some biologists to wonder if smell wasn’t the original sense to drive the development of instrumental learning. But they are not unrelated. If a split-brain patient walks into the room, you would not notice anything unusual. It is what it is…. (In this context, the name of your blog, “SelfAwarePatterns” is most suggestive.). But in this case, it’s after the fact. This delayed response for DCS is counterintuitive at first, as one may suspect that bypassing the ascending peripheral afferents through DCS would reduce the distance traversed by the sensory volley and consequently result in faster reaction times. A wild-card can be any and every thing. The reality/appearance distinction is pretty straight forward. Could it be posssible for the brain to be configured as a feeling but the feeling not felt by the organism? Update 9-11-19: The statement above about LeDoux seeing instrumental learning only in mammals and birds isn’t right.  Please see the correction post. I use the example of feeling a physical touch because it clearly and unambiguously communicates what is meant by the definition in a way that everyone can understand. I’m sure I glossed it at least once already. I was referring to the word sentience. Mammals evolved from a group of reptiles called the synapsids who might have had a smidgen of forebrain, but synapsids evolved from even earlier vertebrates with only a brainstem and the forebrain structure evolved subsequently. Koch apparently believes in a modern variant of panpsychism, i.e., that some form of consciousness can be found in all things, which, I believe is Tononi’s IIT which “differs from classical panpsychism in that it only ascribes consciousness to things with some degree of irreducible cause-effect power, which does not include ‘a bunch of disconnected neurons in a dish, a heap of sand, a galaxy of stars or a black hole …” but, I notice, is apparently not limited to biological consciousness, the only kind of consciousness that’s ever been experienced or inferred. And, additionally for 2: sensory processing is not feeling but takes place prior to feeling. I’m not asking what predictions can be made from a smell. But that has by now stretched to years so that I, for one, would welcome the abandonment by everyone of Nagels’ supposed insight and the shorthand nounification “What-it’s-likeness.”. Joseph Ledoux Classical fear conditioning was used in the present study as a model for investigating emotional learning and memory in human subjects with lesions to the medial temporal lobe. After it posts, feel free to delete this comment if you like. That’s a mistake. For example, lesions to the frontal lobes may impair a person’s ability to plan or adapt to circumstances, but their habitual and reflexive behavior is left intact. BRASH asserts that our memories are stored and retrieved as multi-sensory gestalts that are stories and our pattern-recognition intelligence compares those remembered stories to make predictions and implement creativity. By drawing a distinction between decerebration and decortication are you suggesting that non-cortical portions of the cerebrum produce consciousness? I like the word: Poppycock. “The proto-self occurs not in one brain region but in many, at a multiplicity of levels, from the brainstem and hypothalamus to the cerebral cortex, in structures that are interconnected by neural pathways. Meaning “conscious” (of something) is from 1815. I’m fine with saying dogs have simpler emotions than humans. I omit the paragraphs following that one but the complete information is in Merker’s “Consciousness without a cerebral cortex” and includes references for the experiments performed, all of which I’ve mentioned previously. …all we see in the brainstem (as is customary, I’m including the midbrain region in “brainstem”) is layer 2, and relatively low level layer 2 at that. That’s just a guess though—I’d really like to learn what the objections to neuroscientist Damásio’s definition actually are from any who read this comment and wish to contribute to this discussion. Stephen, It also notes the difference between it and decortication. Note that the American Psychological Association’s rather broad definition of affect is: n. any experience of feeling or emotion, ranging from suffering to elation, from the simplest to the most complex sensations of feeling, and from the most normal to the most pathological emotional reactions. Yes, I do have a theory that’s based on Damasio’s in The Feeling of What Happens and, more specifically, in his paper “Consciousness and the brainstem” with Josef Parvizi. You could argue that an innate association isn’t really an individual prediction, but just an elaborate reflex (or “prediction” of evolution). This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Ramachandran, Elkhonon Goldberg, and many others, are all different. Which is strange since they can be trivially checked by scrolling up. It is not a prediction of the autobiographical self, and so it does not seem like a prediction to you, but that does not mean it is not a prediction. It’s worth noting that we’re comparing conclusions from years of research with numerous contributors, ongoing fine tuning of methodology, and dozens of test subjects, to a tiny study of two subjects decades after they had the surgery. A big part of this, I think, is human introspective abilities, which seem necessary for complex hierachical recursive language and overall symbolic thought. He’s mentioned, for instance, catching the same fish several times in a 20-minute span. Lee, owing to more busyness, I’ll respond later today with an overview of my theory about how it all fits together, which is largely based on Damasio’s thinking. Research on Pavlovian fear conditioning has been very successful in revealing what has come to be called the brain’s fear system. 6. Fixed! The prediction happens at the time of creating the mechanism. By Joseph LeDoux (October 07, 2019) Current Biology (Volume 29 Issue 19) Book review:Evolution of thought and emotion. What’s its adaptive value? It certainly can, as Biological History may attest, if we have to invent the Discipline to explain the Process! Quoting a previous comment, a FAP is: ”… a Fixed Action Pattern, in which a very short to medium length sequence of actions, without variation, are carried out in response to a corresponding clearly defined stimulus.”. If not, that would support the proposal that all newborns are not conscious. In addition to a complete lack of evidence, these quandaries indicate that the cortical consciousness hypothesis lacks credibility and, considering that an alternate hypothesis easily explains or dispenses with all of them, the cortical consciousness hypothesis must be viewed as indefensible. 1. This might be far simpler than what humans feel, perhaps only meeting Barrett’s sense of an affect rather than what Barrett and LeDoux see as the full constructed emotion, but they should be felt states nonetheless.  By LeDoux’s own criteria, that would include any animal capable of instrumental behavior, including mammals and birds.  Admittedly, there’s no guarantee these felt states are conscious ones, but again, definitions. While the previous model provided strong evidence for materialism (split the brain, split the person), the current understanding seems to only deepen the mystery of consciousness. My experience is that the “simple” ones are vague and the precise ones are incomplete. Identifying intellect as an attribute of sentience/consciousness ignores its unconscious nature. I never really feel that connection with fish, amphibians, or reptiles. The absence of that consideration illustrates the possible moral hazards of the cortical consciousness bias, or any unrecognized bias for that matter. I’ve also previously mentioned a surgical nick to the brainstem that apparently “cures” blindsight. This diagram in particular shows the existence of the cerebral hemispheres in fish and amphibians (labeled ‘ch’). Your reference to “not [being] conscious of what we’re not conscious of” is a tautology that doesn’t invalidate William James’ observation, which is universally recognized as a factual description of conscious experience … the unified “movie-in-the brain”. What do scientific theories actually tell us about the world? Although I haven’t said so previously, let me add that the formation of NTC’s—of conscious feelings—can influence resolved action plans and result in precision physical adjustments as in, for instance, sporting activities like the catching of a curve ball. I do the occasional philosophy post (usually knocking down some thought experiment), but I’m more focused on the science than the philosophy. From neurological case studies, we know that reflexive and habitual behavior are associated with subcortical regions. Neonatally decorticated rats as adults show the essentials of maternal behavior, which, though deficient in some respects, allows them to raise pups to maturity. The length and complexity of sentences are reduced. Finally I have some comments responding to your comment of 9/8, following your “So, in brief” …. ), LeDoux does briefly discuss the split-brain patients, and yes he still sees the results as instructive. require a certain higher level of intelligence.”, I do think that without some level of instrumental intelligence, there is no sentience. Graziano’s Attention Schema Theory (AST) “… seeks to explain how an information-processing machine could act the way people do, insisting it has consciousness, describing consciousness in the ways that we do, and claiming that it has an inner magic that transcends mere information-processing, even though it does not.” As far as I could determine, Graziano fails to define consciousness. 2. Syn., see poppycock, balderdash. This unified presentation problem is recognized as unsolved by cortical consciousness proponents, none of whom has proposed any cortical mechanism that would explain such an outcome. As a consequence, this feedback from consciousness means that the philosophical “zombie” is impossible because consciousness can change the brain, so the conscious person and his exact duplicate would not remain identical. “Episodic memory is different from PFS, I think, although they may be somehow related.”. From a paper on this effect (note final sentence): https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6397274/. All vertebrates, including fish, reptiles, and amphibians, have a forebrain and a diencephalon (thalamus), although they only have a pallium rather than a cortex (or nido-pallium in the case of birds). As someone who’s cared for many dogs, I definitely agree that the sense that someone is there is very powerful. It can clarify their conceptual features, and restrain their tendency to transgress the bounds of sense. Thanks Paul! I’ve italicized their two challenges to cortical conscious theories, one being that we don’t actually know and the second one from an evolutionary standpoint. I posed such as assertion at my AI piece mentioned at first, and still contend that cognition does NOT rely upon a certain ‘set’ of disparate brain functions and regions relied upon in frontal cortex designs, where some posit their critical mass for what amounts to nothing more than the expanded version of a form of Intelligence common to Earth, on the human plane of experience, aspirations and autonomy being our most elaborated design, but not distinct from the whole. By György Buzsáki Nor does the startle reflex in the brainstem. It is a prediction that the result, flexing certain muscles, is the proper (valuable) response to the stimulus. James, it depends on what you mean by “the smell.” If you mean the raw signal coming in to the olfactory bulb, then no prediction is happening there. I don’t see the problem. It’s a little better with an actual blog post, where we get to work with a rich text editor, can save drafts, etc, although I’m still using the old editor, not having found the newer ones very enticing. I’ll next (but later) be commenting in response to your comment Mike (still the only one) wherein you replied to that initial comment of mine to James. BRASH defines both of those as outcomes of cortical story pattern matching, as follows: Representing stories as linked “narrative” components, the metaphor has the structure A ➡ B, where ‘A’, ‘B’ and so on are fundamental story primitives such as facts. Fixed. As the Neuroskeptic noted at the time, the results are discordant with too much other neuroscience. Of course, the “feels-like” version doesn’t command the attention that consciousness-as-some-spooky-something does, leaving me somewhat sympathetic to Nagel’s desire for at least five minutes of fame. ( Log Out /  It should be noted at the outset that the proto-self is not the sense of self in the traditional sense, the sort of self on which our current knowing is centered, that is, the core self (the protagonist of core consciousness), and the autobiographical self (the extended form of self which includes one’s identity and is anchored both in our past and anticipated future). 6. Or birds. Emotionally blunted does not reduce or eliminate sentience but, rather, is a change in the character of the feelings experienced. How can a brain be physically configured as a feeling? Of course, only Courtship and Nesting behavior is basically Instinctual…but from which is inspired the quest for Pleasure in all know ‘kinds’ like our own, from mammals to birds at least…if not to fish. I’ve responded to my difficulty in understanding with attempts to clarify my own meaning in hopes that you’ll do the same. Anyone contributing here can read the paper and evaluate the conclusion for themselves. It’s also meant to convey why I don’t think there’s actually any fact of the matter on the definition. The attendant conception was to come to its baroque culmination (or perhaps nadir of confusion) in the writings of Kant and the post-Kantian German idealists.”, Of course, as Hacker points out, the confusion we’re all suffering from results from the all-over-the-map definitions provided by Consciousness Philosophy—philosophical conceptions of consciousness which, as you say, are generally lacking much in the way of “fact[s] of the matter.”. This assignment of functionality is the only element of BRASH that has been discussed. Or is it six consciousnesses in three persons or six persons with three consciousnesses or similar silliness. The term also characterizes and categorizes specific emotions. 1. We can empirically establish the behavioral capabilities of fish, amphibians, reptiles, mammals, birds, insects, etc. Still, I think a glimmer of instrumental learning would have to come with a glimmer of feeling. I’m not sure why you refer to reflexive and habitual behaviors together. A representation built from 3

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